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BOOK REVIEW
BacKs tO thE Wall: 
a REadIng Of alaIn BadIOu’s MeTaPoliTiCS
Mairéad Phillips
Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. Jason Barker, London, Verso, 2005. ISBN: 
184467035X.
Metapolitics is a small book but, given the wide range and scope of the ten essays that 
comprise it, it is more than a little difficult to give a concise précis of its contents. In the 
‘Preface to the English Edition’, however, Badiou gives us, in his idiosyncratic gallic use 
of numbered reasons or arguments, a list of four types of essays you will find in this book; 
1) polemical essays, 2) essays of commentary and support, 3) examinations of major cat-
egories, and 4) philosophical prescriptions, which consists of the final essay only, ‘Politics 
as truth Procedure’, and is, according to Badiou, ‘the most important essay in the book’ 
(xxxvi). this last essay would appear to be, given Badiou’s qualification, a pertinent 
choice to highlight in a review given that one might find there something ‘controversial’. 
and it is true that it is, for this reviewer at least, the most problematic essay in the book. 
however, my intention here is to highlight the first essay. My reason for doing so is sim-
ple. there is much to like in this book, yet one can be guilty of skipping over the good 
bits in a hasty search for the inconsistencies and contentious arguments. so my aim here 
is to say why I like Badiou’s Metapolitics and why I think it is important. 
I recently overheard an exchange between a patron and one of the waiting staff at 
Wall Two 80 in Balaclava, a fashionable suburb of Melbourne, australia. Wall, as it is 
more commonly called, is one of those establishments that have, over the years, attract-
ed a large and loyal following. the type of clientele these establishments attract is the 
caffeine-addicted Melbournian who loves to socialize or read the paper whilst drinking 
their coffee. I am a weekend regular at this particular café. I, too, have become accus-
tomed to the excellent coffee—I’ve not once had a bad one. But I am also attracted by 
MEtaPOlItIcs 369
the more-than-usually standoffish attitude of the staff. they are neither unpleasant nor 
rude, but they by no means go out of their way to make your patronage feel particularly 
welcome or even desired. While I was a little taken aback at first, I have nevertheless 
become accustomed to their reserve as far as customer service standards go; it makes 
the insincere attentions of sales assistants elsewhere seem excessive and vulgar.
at Wall Two 80 you must go to the counter to place your order. If you sit down and 
wait for a member of staff to come to you, you would be waiting all day. But, on this 
particular sunday, this is what two gentlemen did who sat down at the table next to 
mine. they sat down and waited to be served. after some time, one of the men must 
have caught the eye of a waiter, who shortly appeared. this customer let it be known 
that he had been waiting for a while and the waiter informed him that he could take his 
order, but that it was usual for customers to place their order at the bar. the customer 
disputed this procedure, citing a previous visit on which he had been served at his table. 
the waiter simply smiled, took his order and left.
What was going on here? You don’t need to be drinking coffee in a café in Balaclava 
to see this kind of exchange. Everywhere, all over the city, in shops and restaurants, 
on public transport, in places of work, in educational institutions, people engage in es-
sentially unsatisfying disputes over facts and circumstances that are not in the power of 
either party to control or change. It is such a common experience of our social existence 
and yet it is one that does not lend itself much to criticism or analysis. While we may 
be confronted with the consequences of decades-old conflicts in the Middle East on the 
nightly news broadcast and console ourselves with feeling helpless and consequently in-
ured to the difference we can make to such violence and destruction, we less often con-
front the consequences of our daily interactions, such as the one I witnessed at Wall.
as fortune would have it, I had a copy of alain Badiou’s Metapolitics in front of me 
at the time. I was able to imagine, with the help of Badiou’s political prescriptions, a 
scenario in which this gentleman’s complaint might have identified a genuine injustice 
in the operation of Wall Two 80. had, for instance, every other customer been served at 
their table and, when the two men next to me, rightly indignant, questioned the waiter, 
only to be told that it was customary for customers to place their order at the bar, well, 
then, this man would have had a case. surely Wall would have overstepped the bounds 
of non-discriminatory practice, and, in identifying this errant gap in Wall’s non-egalitar-
ian customer service, this man would have had legitimate grounds to be identified in 
equal measure with the rest of Wall’s clientele.
But I am getting too far ahead of myself. the fact that I submit my reading of Ba-
diou’s Metapolitics to an extended personal anecdote follows through on the (personal) in-
junction issued (to me) by various readings of Badiou’s work at any one time, incomplete 
or imperfect though those various readings may be. One cannot fail to feel somehow 
implicated or embroiled in the very object of one’s study, or such is my understanding of 
it. One cannot escape culpability, not least of all because, in Badiou’s reconfiguration of 
politics, political choice is taken away from the objectivity of the collective, yet neither 
is it affected by the vagaries of subjective opinion.
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the choice of political allegiance appears as one which is separated from the 
constraints of collective groups, and which falls within the competent realm of 
personal decisions. But, symmetrically, this choice is no longer subordinated to 
pre-existent ethical maxims, and even less to a spiritual or juridical doctrine of 
human rights (M 6).
this ‘double separation’ inters the would-be political activist, as much as it may 
entice her, to accept the ineluctable consequences of following such stringent condi-
tions. therefore, the very path upon which she sets out could end up, by the process of 
travelling along it, taking her somewhere she had not anticipated. such is the nature of 
a politics ‘unbound’. alternatively, she may have to concede defeat and turn back in the 
face of internal inconsistencies.
In fact, choice has its intelligibility neither in the objective collective nor in a 
subjectivity of opinion. Its intelligibility is internal, in the sequential process of 
action, just as an axiom is intelligible only through the application of the theory 
that it supports (M 6-7).
this is why I begin my review with a situation. the situation I have presented is not 
a very noteworthy one, nor is it, on the surface of it, a particularly politically charged 
one either. nevertheless, if we are prepared to take Badiou at his word, then metapoli-
tics must speak of the situation as we find it. complacency is not an attitude that Badiou 
tolerates. What passes for politics these days is a far cry from the definition Badiou 
would give it in order to reclaim it as a philosophical concept. as such, politics would 
be that which ‘reveals the discursive inconsistency of social statements and in so doing 
pierces through the commonsense fabric of the existing state of the situation’ (M xv), as 
Jason Barker suggests in his translator’s introduction.
Metapolitically speaking, however, Badiou must first speak out against those ‘arch-
complacents’. he is unremittingly remorseless when it comes to his analysis of what he 
sees as partisan ‘political philosophy’. the opening essay of Metapolitics pulls no punches 
and we are left with a very clear idea of where Badiou stands on this particular brand 
of ‘Pharisaism’. the polemic against ‘political philosophy’ takes for its concrete example 
the french edition of hannah arendt’s lectures on Kant’s political philosophy, edited by 
Myriam Revault d’allonnes. Badiou focuses his particular attention on the positive wrap 
given to public opinion and consensus by Kant-arendt-Revault d’allones at the expense of 
‘univocal and tyrannical’ truth. In relation to which, Badiou has this to say:
the antinomy of truth and debate is a bad joke. Except, of course, if one deems it 
necessary to assert special rights for falsity and for lying. In this case, it would instead 
be necessary to say the following: debate, which confers rights without norms upon falsity 
and lying, constitutes the very essence of politics. But what Revault d’allones calls 
‘the courage of judgement’ is more like the laziness of those who are sheltered from 
every norm and see their errors or their lies protected by right (M 14-5).
according to arendt’s and Revault-d’allones’ claims, for philosophy to be faithful to 
‘democracy’ so conceived, it is necessary for it to ‘sever “the” political from the proto-
cols of decision, to reduce it to the judgement of the spectator, and to think of debate as 
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a plural confrontation of opinions without truth’ (M 16).
In this light, I wish to contend that the scene I witnessed at Wall epitomizes this 
‘type’ of political indecisionism that currently exists, and the extent to which its structure 
is unquestioningly repeated and perpetuated. the capitalist-parliamentarianism that 
organizes the political machinery that administers the state also structures our daily in-
teractions; hence, we witness these types of fruitless ‘debates’ where the ‘public plurality 
of opinions’ (M 16) marks the position of not only our parliamentary parties but the eve-
ryday interactions of the man on the street. Badiou could not state the case more clearly: 
‘It is obvious we are living through the unconditioned primacy of opinions’ (M 17), but 
what may be unclear is just how endemic it actually is. It was brought to my attention, 
whilst reading Metapolitics, that the instances are manifold and localized. People love to 
hear the sound of their own voice. the concatenation of voices, then, is the ideological 
wall of noise threatening to drown out any rehabilitation of the ‘theme of truth’. 
too often, members of the public display a belief in their ability to manipulate and 
control the world to satisfy the claims made by their ego. this temptation betrays a 
desire for conflict, however unpleasant, superficial and unwarranted. If a person is not 
able to express their opinion freely, they instinctively feel that their rights are being vio-
lated. Essentially the man at Wall was telling the waiter, ‘as contingent and superficial 
as my existence is, I have a right to exercise the public use of my judgement, and there’s 
nothing you can do to stop me’. how do these people think that a place like Wall Two 
80 could continue to function if it had to kowtow to the dictates of every customer that 
walked through its door? Essentially, they don’t think. as long as they can debate the issue, 
they feel validated and, dare I say it, vindicated.
far from bearing witness to the disintegrating fabric of social reality, these kinds of 
altercations are in fact necessary to the smooth running of inherently antagonistic social 
relations. If one were reading nietzsche, these daily antagonisms would be seen to be, 
not signs or symptoms of an imminent social degeneration and decline, but signs and 
symptoms of a society already degenerated, already in decline. But what can nietzsche do 
or say that does not elicit in his reader an ironical sneer, all the while said reader sips 
her latté, giving into the ‘the necessity for stronger and stronger and more and more 
frequent stimulants’ (twilight of the Idols)? One is also the target, when one submits 
to drinking coffee in cafés, of a designation favoured by the current political climate in 
order to maintain an unchallenged allegiance to conservative mores, that is, to a market 
economy, which relentlessly marginalizes and discredits any opposition, however nomi-
nal and ineffectual.
Metapolitics is effective inasmuch as we are given a means by which the state of the 
situation may be questioned, measured and put at a distance which invariably opens up 
the possibility of politics as thought-praxis. In order to prepare the ground, however, one 
need not be engaged solely with analyses of the works of so-called ‘political philosophy’; 
one need only go so far as the local café; more often than not, not even as far as that.
